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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GREG F. KNIGHT, STEVE HALL, 
ROY NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON, 
personally and on behalf of a 
class of persons similarly 
situated, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a 
governmental entity, 
Defendant/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 20000864-CA 
AN APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT 
LAKE DEPARTMENT, The Hon. David Young, Judge Presiding 
(Trial Court Case No. 97-090-7950 CV) 
Plaintiffs/Appellants submit the following brief: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(j) (1953 as amended). 
The case was transferred by the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition pursuant to an 
ORDER dated January 17, 2001. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Whether appellants (hereinafter "Plaintiff-Officers") 
were employees of Salt Lake County based upon written employment 
contracts thereby subjecting their wage claims to a six-year 
statute of limitations; or, whether Plaintiff-Officers are 
"statutory employees" thereby subjecting their wage claims to a 
three-year statute of limitations. 
2) Whether the documents presented by Plaintiff-Officers 
establish a written employment contract. 
ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED 
1) Whether Plaintiff-Officers were employees of Salt Lake 
County based upon written employment contracts was raised and 
considered at hearing/trial on April 18, 20002. Transcript, p. 
12:9 to 15:18; p. 5:6 to 9:19; p. 42:9-21. Order on Motions for 
Summary Judgment, p. 2 (R. 1458-1459), Attachment "D" attached 
hereto. This issue was previously raised in Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and supporting Memorandum (R. 75, 
81); it was considered at hearing on February 6, 1998 (R. 288) 
and by the court's Order Granting Partial Summary, p. 296 (R. 
292), Attachment "C" attached hereto. The issue was also raised 
2
 The case below was set for trial on April 18, 2000. 
However, the court considered and ruled on the parties' cross 
motions for summary judgment immediately prior to trial. 
Transcript, p. 2:15 to 3:9. 
2 
in Motion for Ruling on Applicable Statute of Limitations, and 
supporting Memorandum (R. 119, 142). Finally, this issues was 
raised in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting 
Memorandum, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting Memorandum (R. 410, 413, 751, 757). 
2) Whether the documents presented by Plaintiff-Officers 
establish a written employment contract was raised and considered 
at hearing/trial on April 18, 2000. Transcript, p. 11:8 - 12:25; 
p. 20:5 - 22:18; p. 42:9-16. This issue was also raised in the 
pleadings mentioned above. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1) The issues presented are questions of law. As such, 
they are reviewed under the "correctness" standard. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Certified Surety Group, Ltd. 
v. UT Inc., 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998) ("In reviewing a 
trial court's grant of summary judgment, *we do not defer to the 
trial court's conclusion of law but review them for 
correctness.'" (citation omitted)). 
2) The underlying facts are not in dispute and should be 
reviewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs/appellants. 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982) (court to 
present facts and reasonable inferences from them in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment); Harnicher v. 
University of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998) (on summary 
3 
judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action based upon written contracts by STEVE 
HALL, ROY NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON, former employees of Salt Lake 
County, who worked as staff members in the Salt Lake County Metro 
Jail and/or Oxbow Jail. This action below was certified as a 
class action pursuant to Ut. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)& (2) . Order 
Granting Partial Summary Judgment, p. 2 (R. 293-294). The 
appellants herein, Hall, Neizer and Hudson, were certified as the 
class representatives and were the named plaintiffs below. SALT 
LAKE COUNTY was the defendant below and is the appellee herein. 
After July 16, 1991, the County employed Hall, Neizer and 
Hudson (hereinafter "Plaintiff-Officers") in various occupations 
and positions as staff members in operating the Salt Lake County 
Metro Jail and/or Oxbow Jail. During the time period from July 
16, 1991 to late 1995, the County required Plaintiff-Officers to 
arrive and to report for work ten (10) minutes early for briefing 
or roll call before the beginning of every assigned regular work 
shift. The County's policy was to not pay Plaintiff-Officers for 
the required briefing time they worked before each work shift. 
Upon hearing on February 6, 1998, the lower court found that 
Plaintiff-Officers' claims were based upon written contracts and 
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therefore governed by a six (6) year statute of limitations. 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, p. 3 (R. 294), 
Attachment "C" attached hereto. 
Subsequently (two (2) years later), the lower court allowed 
Salt Lake County to re-argue these issues and found that the 
Plaintiff-Officers were not contractual employees; rather, the 
court found that the Plaintiff-Officers were statutory employees. 
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, p. 2 (R. 1458), Attachment 
"D" attached hereto. As such, the court found that Plaintiff-
Officers' claims are governed by a three (3) year statute of 
limitations, thereby finding no triable issues. Order on Motions 
for Summary Judgment, p. 2 (R. 1458-1459). 
Thus, Plaintiff-Officers' claims were dismissed, a summary 
judgment was granted, and this timely appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellants, STEVE HALL, ROY NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON 
former employees of Salt Lake County, ("Plaintiff-Officers") 
bring this action personally and on behalf of other employees of 
Salt Lake County similarly situated, to recover unpaid wages 
under employment contracts. Amd. Complt. 1 1 (R. 333), 
Attachment "A" attached hereto; Aff. of Neizer (dated 12/12/97), 
Hudson (dated 11/21/97) & Hall (dated 11/25/97), 11 2 & 5 (R. 28, 
14, 153) . 
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2. HALL, NEIZER and HUDSON worked in the Salt Lake County 
Metro Jail and/or Oxbow Jail (hereinafter "Jails'') . They were 
uniform services personnel. Amd. Complt. 1 5 (R. 334); Answer to 
Amd. Complt. 1 5 (R. 365), Attachment "B" attached hereto; Order 
Granting Partial Summary Judgment, p. 5 (R. 296) . 
3. Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY is a government entity. At 
all times pertinent, from July 16, 1991 through and including 
July 16, 1997 inclusive, or during portions of that period Salt 
Lake County employed the Plaintiff-Officers in the operations of 
the Jails. Amd. Complt. 1 6 / 1 8 (R. 334); Answer to Amd. 
Complt. 1 6; 1 8 (R. 365); Aff. of Neizer, Hudson & Hall, M 2-3 
(R. 28, 14, 153); Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, p. 5 
(R. 296). 
4. The periods of employment of named Plaintiff-Officers as 
jail staff members are: 
STEVE HALL: February, 1977 through February, 1995; 
ROY NEIZER: June, 1991 through April, 1995; and, 
BROCK HUDSON: January, 1990 through October, 1993. 
Amd. Complt. 1 9 (R. 335); Answer to Amd. Complt. 1 9 (R. 365); 
Aff. of Neizer, Hudson & Hall, SI 3 (R. 28, 14, 153). 
5. The Plaintiff-Officers had written employment contracts 
with Salt Lake County. Amd. Complt. 1 10 (R. 336); Aff. of 
Neizer, Hudson & Hall, 11 2-4 (R. 28, 14, 153). 
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6. All contracts entered into by Salt Lake County, 
including employment agreements, must be in writing. Salt Lake 
County Ordinance § 2.04.100. 
7. During the period from July 16, 1991 to July 16, 1997, 
Salt Lake County required Plaintiff-Officers to arrive and to 
begin work ten (10) minutes early for briefing or roll call 
(hereinafter "briefing time") before the beginning of every 
assigned regular work shift. Amd. Complt. SI 11 (R. 336); Aff. of 
Neizer, Hudson & Hall, SI 6 (R. 28, 14, 153); Order Granting 
Partial Summary Judgment, p. 5 (R. 296); Depo. of County,3 p. 
44:19-25 (R. 711) . 
8. Between July 16, 1991 and July 16, 1997, Salt Lake 
County subjected Plaintiff-Officers to disciplinary action if 
they were not present for the briefing time. 2nd Depo. of 
Cunningham, p. 32:1-6 (R. 726); Amd. Complt. SI 18 (R. 338); 
Answer to Amd. Complt. SI 18 (R. 366); Aff. of Neizer, Hudson & 
Hall, SI 6 (R. 28, 14, 153); Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment, p. 5 (R. 296); Defendant's Answers to Interr. pp. 22-
23, SI 50 (a verbal order) (R. 679-680). 
9. Plaintiff-Officers have not been paid nor compensated 
for the ten (10) minute briefing time they worked before each 
3
 Pursuant to Ut. R. Civ. Pro. 30(b)(6), Susan Biesele was 
designated as the representative of Salt Lake County and through 
her the deposition of Salt Lake County was taken on June 17, 
1999. 
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work shift prior to February 1, 1994. Amd. Complt. 1 12 (R. 
336); Aff. of Neizer, Hudson & Hall, 1 7 (R. 28, 14, 153); 3rd 
Depo. of Cunningham, p. 7:12-15 (R. 714); Depo. of County, p. 
7:1-14 (R. 701); p. 16:6-10 (R. 704). 
10. In approximately June, 1996, after Salt Lake County was 
sued in federal court by Plaintiff-Officers herein, (referred to 
as the Villalobos case), the County paid most plaintiff class 
members in wages for the uncompensated briefing time worked after 
February 1, 1994. The class claims herein are for compensation 
for the unpaid briefing time worked prior to February 1, 1994. 
Plaintiff-Officers seek compensation for the unpaid briefing time 
they worked prior to and after February 1, 1994. Amd. Complt. ^ 
13 (R. 336-337); Aff. of Neizer, Hudson & Hall, 1 8 (R. 29, 15, 
154) . 
11. Defendant never granted compensatory time off to its 
jail staff members. Since 1986 the County has always had a 
policy of paying jail employees and members of the plaintiff 
class wages for time worked. Plaintiff class members who worked 
more than their regularly scheduled shift/hours were to be 
compensated by payment of wages for the additional time worked. 
Amd. Complt. 1 17 (R. 337-338); Aff. of Neizer, Hudson & Hall, 1 
11 (R. 29-30, 15-16, 154-155); 2nd Depo. of Cunningham, p. 9:8-13 
(R. 721); p. 17:5-7 (R. 723). 
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12. The uncompensated briefing time required of Plaintiff-
Officers prior to November, 1995 was neither occasional nor 
sporadic. Amd. Complt. 1 19 (R. 338); Answer to Amd. Complt. 1 
19 (R. 366); Aff. of Neizer, Hudson & Hall, M 6-7 (R. 28, 14, 
153); Defendant's Answers to Interr. p. 19, 1 40 (R. 677); pp. 19 
-20, 1 41 (R. 677-678). 
13. The uncompensated briefing time was easily computed, 
recorded and subject to easy book keeping procedures; it was 
required and worked every assigned shift of every class member. 
Amd. Complt. 1 20 (R. 338); Answer to Amd. Complt. 1 20 (R. 366); 
Aff. of Neizer, Hudson & Hall, 11 6-7 (R. 28, 14, 153); 
Defendant's Answers to Interr. p. 20, 11 43-45 (R. 678). 
14. In approximately November, 1995, defendant changed its 
policy as to payment of wages for the briefing time. Currently 
and since -November, 1995, jail staff members are required to 
report fifteen (15) minutes before their regular shift for 
briefing time. Jail staff members are now compensated with pay 
for the mandatory briefing time. Amd. Complt. 1 21 (R. 338); 
Answer to Amd. Complt. 1 21 (R. 366); Aff. of Neizer, Hudson & 
Hall, 1 11 (R. 29-30, 15-16, 154-155). 
15. Based upon their employment contracts, Plaintiff-
Officers seek compensation for unpaid briefing time they worked 
between July 16, 1991 and July 16, 1997. Amd. Complt. M 22 - 23 
(R. 339); Aff. of Neizer, Hudson & Hall, 1 12 (R. 30, 16, 155). 
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16. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23, this 
action has been certified as a class action. That class is: 
All jail staff employees of the defendant during the 
time period of July 16, 1991 to July 16, 1997 
inclusive, who were required to report to work at the 
Salt Lake County Metro or Oxbow Jails ten (10) or more 
minutes before their assigned work shifts for briefing 
time and who did not receive compensation (wages or 
compensatory time) from the defendant for that time 
worked. 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, p. 2 (R. 293) . 
17. The employment agreements between Plaintiff-Officers 
and Salt Lake County were that Plaintiff-Officers would be paid a 
set hourly rate for all time each worked and when a Plaintiff-
Officer worked more than a scheduled shift he/she was to be 
compensated either with time off ("schedule adjustment") or 
additional pay. Interr. Answers Neizer, Hudson & Hall 
(hereinafter "Interr. Answers Hudson"), p. 4, 5 3 (R. 685).4 
Plaintiffs never agreed to work for defendant without 
compensation. Id., p. 5, 1 5 (R. 686). On occasions Plaintiff-
Officers might voluntarily have stayed a few minutes late at the 
end of a shift to complete an assignment and not seek 
compensation for that time, however that was not routine nor 
mandatory. IcL., p. 7, 1 9 (R. 687-688). Plaintiff-Officers were 
prohibited by County policy from voluntarily working without pay. 
4
 The three (3) sets of answers to interrogatories are 
virtually identical, therefore only one set (from Plaintiff-
Officer Hudson) is cited herein. 
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Id^, pp. 7-8 (R. 687-688); 3rd Depo. of Cunningham, p. 8:4-16 (R. 
715); Depo. of County, p. 6:2-3 (R. 701). 
18. Each Plaintiff-Officer and class member worked an 
additional ten (10) minutes as unpaid briefing time for every 
shift that he or she worked during 1991 - 1995 inclusive. 
Interr. Answers Hudson, p. 4, SI 4 (R. 685-686) . 
19. Plaintiff-Officers were ordered by their supervisors 
not to record the briefing time on plaintiffs' time cards. 
Interr. Answers Hudson, pp. 8-9, f 11 (R. 688-689); 2nd Depo. of 
Cunningham, p. 18:14 to p. 19:6 (R. 723). Plaintiff-Officers who 
did record the briefing time on their time cards, were ordered by 
their supervisors to remove that time from the time cards. 
Interr. Answers Hudson, pp. 8-9, fl 11 (R. 688-689); 2nd Depo. of 
Cunningham, p. 19:17 to p. 20:18 (R. 723). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This is a contractual dispute between Plaintiff-Officers and 
Salt Lake County. Plaintiff-Officers worked for Salt Lake County 
based upon written contracts. Each Plaintiff-Officer has written 
documents establishing a contract whereby each would work for 
Salt Lake County and the County would pay for their services. 
These documents set forth terms of the employment, starting date, 
rate of pay and other conditions of the employment. 
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The employment documents set forth an offer of employment, 
an acceptance of employment, work performed and a promise to pay 
wages for work performed, the nature of the employment, starting 
date of employment, rate of pay, job code and other information 
establishing the nature of employment. Plaintiff-Officers have 
established a breach of contract in that Salt Lake County has 
refused to pay Plaintiff-Officers for the briefing time worked. 
Therefore, this Court should overturn the lower court's erroneous 
ruling that appellants were not contractual employees. 
The lower court erroneously interpreted and applied Horn v. 
Ut. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Ut. App. 1998). Horn does 
not support a conclusion that governmental employees have no 
contractual employment rights. Rather, Horn represents the 
premise that the Utah State Personal Management Act and 
implementing regulations, absent additional alterations or 
agreements, do not form an employment contract. 
The statutory and contractual rights of state or county 
employees are concomitant. The court must look to the right that 
is being enforced to see whether a statutory or contractual 
analysis applies. Plaintiff-Officers' wage claim is a 
contractual claim, and subject to a contractual analysis. The 
employment agreements between Plaintiff-Officers and Salt Lake 
County were that plaintiffs would be paid a set hourly rate for 
all time worked and when a Plaintiff-Officer worked more than a 
12 
scheduled shift he/she was to be compensated either with time off 
during that pay period or additional pay. Nevertheless, the 
C o u i 11 y 1: 1 a s i * e f u s e d 1: o p a y f • : i !:  1: i e b r i e f i r I g time. T here fore, this 
Court should determine Plaintiff-Officers' wage claim, is based 
u p < i) i i 11: i e w r :i 11: e i I :: ::»i 11: r a c t s :> f t: I: I e p a r t: :i e s . 
The decision to require staff members to attend briefings 
and not pay for that time was a jail commanders' deci si oi i The 
decision was an erroneous interpretation by the jail commanders 
of the rules, policies, procedures, regulations and practices of 
the s h e r i f f s office. That erroneous decision, was not a policy 
or decision of the Legislature, the County, the Sheriff nor of 
11: I e C o i 11 I t y C :: i i w i i s s i o i :n I: J c 1:1 :i :i i I g :i i i. 11: I 3 s t a t, i 1 1 • : r y o i p • :) 1 :i c y s :: 1: I e n i e 
allows Salt Lake County to force Plaintiff-Officers to wc rk 
un c omp e n s a t e :I S a ] 1: I i a ke C • : • i 11 I I: \, a, dm i t s t: 1: i.e f a i ] i i r e t • : • p a. y 
Plaintiff-Officers for the briefing time was an error. 
Thfir^f--;r^f under the County rules policies, procedures, 
regulations and practices of the sheriff's office, plaintiffs 
should, have been, paid for the briefings. 
N v, statute : •_ I; ^  o iiate creates r.. 1 1 a b ill, t y o f S a 1 t I »a .1 : e • 
Cour.t> *o on w a g e s to the P l a i n t i f f - O f f i c e r s . The l i a b i l i t y or 
c :. . . : . • . : J: r r : t .3 i [ i • 3 i / c i 1 : • E :I :i s 1: a s • 3 • :i 
upon the emp.loym.ent contracts between, the County and the 
p 1 a :i n t i f f - 0 f f i c e r s . P ] a :i i I t. i f: f - 0 f f i c e r t ;' < : J a., i n: i. s, t h e r e f o r e, are 
subject to a six (6) year statute of limitations. Plaintiff-
Officers' claims back to July 16, 1991 are within that limit. 
This Court should determine that the documents presented by 
Plaintiff-Officers establish a written employment contract; that 
Plaintiff-Officers were employees of Salt Lake County based upon 
written employment contracts thereby subjecting their wage claims 
to a six-year statute of limitations; and remand the case below 
for an accounting of wages owed to named plaintiffs and plaintiff 
class. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS IS A CONTRACTUAL DISPUTE. 
The underlying dispute is a contractual dispute between 
Plaintiff-Officers and Salt Lake County. The court below 
incorrectly found that the plaintiffs and plaintiff class are 
''statutory employees". 
Plaintiff-Officers, STEVE HALL, ROY NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON, 
and class members worked for Salt Lake County based upon written 
contracts. Each Plaintiff-Officer has written documents 
establishing a contract whereby each would work for Salt Lake 
County and the County would pay for their services.5 Those 
documents include Letter from Sheriff N.D. "Pete" Hayward to 
Brock E. Hudson of January 11, 1990 (R. 130), Letter from Sheriff 
These documents are attached hereto as Attachment "E". 
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Aaron D. Kennard to Roy David Neizer of June 1, 1991 (R. 131) 6, 
Notice of Personnel Action ; (R. 132 & 1 3 3 ) , Salt Lake County 
Deputy Sheriff's Merit Service Commission Policies and Procedures 
(R. 134-140 (policy related to payment of wages)), and, written 
a g r e erne n t s t c : f o 11 c • w : 3 I i < :  I I i i :i ] c >: • , (R. ] 4 ] ) H. T I: I 3 s e x a r i o u s 
documents combined constitute an employment contract based upon 
w r i 11 e n i r 1 s t r 1 lme n. t s . T he s e do c 1 ime n t s s e t f o 1: t: 1 1 11 1.e 1 1 a. t \ 1 r e c f t h e 
employment, starting date of employment, rate of pay, job code 
and other information establishing the nature of employment. 
Save these written documents, the terms and conditions of 
Plaintiff-Officers' employment are not determined. For i nstance, 
Plaintiff-0fficers individua1 hour1y rates and j ob 1eve1s are set 
not by statute, but rather by the written agreements between 
emp 1 oye e a 1 1 d ei 1: i/p J o ye r E ] a i 1 11 :i f f - 0 f f 1 c = r s ' ei 1: ip J o yme 1 11 :i s :i 1 1 s ome 
degree controlled by statute and constitutional provisions (as 
d esc r i b e d b e ] o w) t i 11 1 1 : • t: 1: : • 1 1 1 a d e g r e e 1:1 1 a t :i I: • :: e a s e s b e :i 1 1 :j 
"contractual" :i 1 1 nature . 
6
 Each Plaintiff-Officer is given an Offer of Employment 
Letter. 
7
 The Notice of Personnel Action forms are referred to as 
"CP-4" forms. Every correctional officer working i n the County 
Jails has a completed "CP-4" signed and approved by the County 
Commission. These forms authorize employment and. compensation 
(R. 132 & 133) . 
8
 Each Plaint.] ff-Officer signs an agreement that they will 
follow the rules. 
Absent the title "Employment Contract", every required 
element is present in Plaintiff-Officers' contracts: offer of 
employment, terms of the employment, starting date, rate of pay 
and other conditions of the employment. See Transcript, p. 21:3 
to p. 22:18. 
Plaintiff-Officers' written contracts comply with mandates 
of Salt Lake County. Salt Lake County Ordinance § 2.04.100 reads 
as follows: 
2.04.100 Contract authorization 
The commission shall make or authorize the making of 
all contacts to which the county may be a party, and no 
contract shall be entered into on behalf of or be binding on 
the county unless it is reduced to writing and approved by 
the commission, or expressly authorized by ordinance or 
resolution. 
In full conformance, Plaintiff-Officers' employment 
contracts contain approval from all three (3) Salt Lake County 
Commissioners. Nothing in that ordinance indicates that it does 
not apply to employment contracts. 
The employment agreements were that Plaintiff-Officers would 
be paid a set hourly rate for all time worked and when a 
Plaintiff-Officer worked more than a scheduled shift he/she was 
to be compensated either with time off within that pay period 
("schedule adjustment") or additional pay. Interr. Answers 
Hudson, p. 4, 1 3 (R. 685). Plaintiff-Officers never agreed to 
work for Salt Lake County without compensation. Id., p. 5, I 5 
(R. 686). Plaintiff-Officers were prohibited by County policy 
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iroiu voluntarily working without pay. JJL./ pp. '• - iP. bd ' b d p ) ; 
3rd Depo. ot Cunningham, | <:4-W) (P. 7 1 5 ) ; Depo. of County p. 
6:2-3 P. i n , 'Ml I J[ 'wiint;, Personnel Policy and Procedure, 
Overtime & Compensatory Time, § 5420 (2. 8) (effective 04-02-92) 
• '
 ;
 )vertime & Compensatory Time, ;S M P 1 1 'P.'1! 'effect.!1;-: 
05-25-94) (R. 5 0 0 ) . 
In Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co, , 80 P.2d 1 7] (I I ! c 11 1 938) 1 :he 
Utah Supreme Court considered what constitutes a contract 
"founded upon an instrument in writing.11 
[I]f the fact - •! liability arises or is assumed or 
imposed from the instrument itself, or its recitals, 
the liability is founded upon an instrument in writing. 
If the instrument acknowledges or states a fact from,, 
which the law implies an obligation to pay, such 
obligation is founded upon a written instrument within 
the statute, ,1 f t:„ 1 ie writing upon ,i ts face shows a 
liability to pay such liability is on a written 
instrument within the statute of limitations. So, 
also, is an, action in which the instrument in writing 
itself contains the contract or promise to pay or do 
the thing, to compel, the doing of whi ch the action is 
brought. 
Bracklein, 80 P.2d at 476. 
"[A] cause of action is not founded on a written instrument 
merely because it is indirectly connected with, the instrument-. " 
Id. However, where, as in the instant case, the written 
i n s t r i II i: le n t s : • o i I t : a i i l 1 1 ; t < 5 J *i t t,: :> i, I 1 : o i I c i „i„ t „. :i o i :i 3 • f t:„ 1: i, <::: i • : < : • i I t r a c 1 „, t „. h e 
action is founded upon, instruments in writing. Id. 
S„ i m i I a„i t :,„c » B r a c k l e i n , P1! a„ i r It i ff-0f£„ Lcers""" emp >] c -ymei I 1 
documents herein, state facts "from which the ] aw implies an 
1 ; 
obligation to pay." Id. The Offer of Employment letters offer 
employment, contingent upon passing the physical examination. 
Plaintiff-Officers met the requisite physical conditions, and 
their employment was therefore founded upon said letters. 
Similarly, the terms of compensation recited in each Notice of 
Personnel Action are terms which create an obligation to pay. 
The terms set forth in the DSMSC Policies and Procedures also 
provide terms of the employment contract. The various documents 
were issued "substantially contemporaneously" (Winegar v. 
Froerer, 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991)) for each Plaintiff-Officer, 
are interrelated and are construed as one contract. 
Under Utah law, Plaintiff-Officers have established a 
written contract: an rffer of employment, an acceptance of 
employment, work performed and a promise to pay wages for work 
performed. Plaintiff-Officers have established a breach of 
contract in that Salt Lake County has refused to pay Plaintiff-
Officers for the briefing time worked. Therefore, this Court 
should overturn the lower court's erroneous ruling that 
appellants were not contractual employees. 
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1 1
 • PLAINTIFF-OFFICERS ' WAGE CLAIM IS A CONTRACTUAL CLAIM. THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINT IFF-OFFICERS AND SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN THIS MATTER IS CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE, AUGMENTED OR LIMITED 
BY STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
The lower court erroneously interpreted and applied Horn v. 
Ut. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Ut. App. 1998). Based 
upoi :i :i ts i i I 1:erpretati oi I :>f I I c i i; 1.1( 1:): Ie ::• : i ] r 1: be 1 • : w found that state 
employees/civil servants are statutory in their rights in 
r e J a t :i : > i I t : 11: I e :i r • sn i;p J o yrn e i I 1: T r a n s c ? i | > I , \ ' I I I "'-
court then found that the Plaintiff-Officers were "statutory 
employees", implying that Plai nti ff- nffi -ers l.a^ f- i. c>ul r a< iu-il 
rights. Transcript, p. 42:13-16. Horn did not hold that che 
basic relationship between employees and a qovernment employer is 
purely statutory :i i i nature. Rather, Horn represents the mere 
proposition that the Utah State Personal Management Act and 
implement n.'j U>>\\}\,J\ i"ii: , ih^'pf MUiti-aidi d 1 Leid L i > 'lis or 
agreements, do not form an employment contract. Horn, 962 P.2d at 
1 0 1 
Horn involved a state employee who, ultimately, was required 
under state law to exhaust administrative remedi es. y Horn, 962 
P.2d at 99-1 Ul. Michael Horn, was an employee of the Department of 
9
 Horn involved the termination of government employment, an 
area in which extensive rights and procedures are administra-
tively established. No similar or parallel mandate exists for 
plaintiffs :i i I thi s action. No requirement exists that plaintiffs 
file an administrative grievance on a wage claim much less that 
they exhaust administrative remedies prior to a suit for non-
payment of wages. 
i 
Public Safety as a programmer/analyst. Id. at97. He was a 
career civil servant, not a sworn law enforcement officer. Id. 
After ongoing clashes with co-employees and supervisors, Horn was 
disciplined for his statement that he had "the power to crash and 
disable the Department computer system" and his employment was 
terminated. Id. at 98. 
Horn filed an administrative appeal pursuant to the Utah 
State Personal Management Act. Horn, 962 p.2d at 98. However, 
his administrative review was dismissed for lack of prosecution. 
Id. at 99. Horn then filed a lawsuit against the Department 
claiming his dismissal violated the Personal Management Act and 
the Department's policies and procedures. Id. at 98. The trial 
court granted the Department's summary judgment motion and 
dismissed Horn's claims. Id. 
On appeal, Horn argued that "the trial court erred in barring 
his wrongful termination claim under the three-year statute of 
limitations for violations of rights created by statute." Id. at 
98-99. Horn argued that his action was "for breach of contract 
subject to the six-year statute of limitations for claims arising 
out of contracts in writing under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (2) 
(1996)."10 Horn, 962 P.2d at 99. Horn argued "that the Personnel 
Management Act and the implementing regulations constitute a 
10
 Horn also appealed an issue related to a disability 
claim. That issue is not relevant to the case at bar. 
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written employment contract between [him] and the [State]." _!_;_, 
at 100. 11 i essence, Horn argued that: he 1: ia< i s e p a r a t e arid :iist... . •„ 
employment contract with the State based upon the Act and 
regulations. 
Tl le C< : )i u • !: : : f Appeals disagreed. Id. Hon i' S argument failed 
because he did not demonstrate that the State entered "into a 
co " -' •: " : a l t e r e d or a d d e d t:< : tl: i :: [ex.i s Li r lg] terms 
and conditions of public employment.'7 Id. at 101 (emphasis 
added) . A b s e n t s a :i d a ] t e r a t :i c i • :: :i : a :::i d i t ::l :: i I , I I. D HI ' s t • B r rn i r a * 
was exclusively governed by the Personnel Management Act and 
subject to administrative review through that Act. Id. 1 is a 
result, the Court found that Horn, failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies, depriving the Court of Appeals jurisdiction in the 
ma: :»e: , .i -
Horn does not support a conclusion that governmental. 
e m p 1 o "V e e s I: I a ; e i: i c ::: o i I t r a c 1: i i a ] e n i,p ] o yn t e i I t r :i g I: I 1:: s , R a 1:1: I e r, I:: 1: I e 
case indicates the opposite conclusion: publ i c employment rights 
caii I. "j I t •• i i d i njqnKMit t-M 1 !l,i -u^h i.l M t iiu I i i ili'l'i, Thi-: 
Plaintiff-Officers at bar acknowledge that their employment can 
11
 Horn, attempted to frame his complaint as a breach of 
contract because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies 
against his employer, the State of Utah. Horn, 962 p.2d at 99. 
However, having determined it lacked jurisdiction, the Court of 
Appeals did not rule on the statute of ; imitation issue raised 
pursuant to Horn's contractual argument (the Court did discuss 
statute of 1 :i mi 1:at i on related to Horn' c H ^  sabi 1 11y c.1 aim (Id, at 
1 0 1 - 1 0 3 ) ) . 
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be limited or augmented by statutory provisions. They also have 
contractual rights. Their wage claim is based upon written 
instruments, and thus contractual. 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992) 
(Thurston I); Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 
1995)(Thurston II) is likewise instructive. In Thurston I & II, 
an employee of Box Elder County sued for wrongful termination "as 
an independent action for breach of an employment contract." 
Thurston I, 835 P.2d 165, 167 n.l (1992). The employee was 
terminated in a reduction in force layoff. Thurston II, 892 P.2d 
at 1036. The Box Elder County Policy and Procedures Manual set 
forth criteria for such layoff; it provided that "length of 
service and/or individual performance [should] be considered when 
implementing a reduction in force." Id. However, Thurston's 
supervisor told "Thurston that he had been selected for 
[termination] because he could tolerate the separation better 
financially than some younger . . . employees with families."12 
Id. 
After completing the administrative process, Thurston sued 
claiming that his termination was a breach of the employment 
contract set forth in the Policies and Procedures Manual. 
12
 During the administrative process, the County formulated 
other reasons for Thurston's termination, including poor job 
performance. Thurston II, 892 P.2d at 1036. 
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Thurston I, 835 P.2d 16 7.13 The lower court held that the County 
had proper I y followed its policies in terminating Thurston. I d_^_ 
at ] 6 1 • Ihurston appealed. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court declared, "[Bjefore 
c o n s i de r i i I g \ ih e 1 : 1 i e J 1 : 1 I e < ,. 1: > r e a c 1: i e c I « 11 I en i.p 1 o yme nt contract, 
we must first determine whether the County'' s plan for layoffs 
comp 1 i es v* i 1 I [ s 1:atI :it• : r\, reqi i:i rernent s ] ' TI m r s t o n 1, 8 35 E 2 :i a t 
168. The Supreme Court found that county employees were given 
augmented, statutory rights in addition, to thei r enip] o\, 'inei I 1: 
contract as to layoffs. See e.g. Thurston I, 8 35 P.2d at 16 9-
3 70 , Thus, termination of county employees was governed :i n part 
by t: he Coun t y Personnel Managernen t Ac t -4 (I J1: a 1: I Code Ann. § § ] ; ' 
13
 The parties agreed that Thurston's employment was 
governed by the Policies and Procedures Manual The case was "an 
action for breach of an express or implied employment contract . 
. . ." Thurston I, 835 P.2d 167-167. Plaintiff-Officers' 
contractual claims are similarly based upon written instruments. 
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 The County Employee Managemei it Act, Utah Code Anr i. § 17-
33-1 et: seq., (1953 as amended) and the Deputy Sheriffs' Merit 
Service Commission Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-1 et seq. (1953 as 
amended) are not applicable to the case at bar. Those statutes 
deal mainly with selection, hiring, promotion, discipline and 
discharge of deputy sheriffs under a "merit system.11 They do not 
give the Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Service Commission the authority 
to resolve wages claims or disputes over unpaid wages. Id. 
Salt Lake County asserted a defense of failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. Answer, p. 1 (R. 71), The court below 
dismissed that defense. Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, 
pp. 3-4 (R. 294-295). The County was allowed to reassert the 
defense "by setting out any administrative remedies . 
applicable." Id. at 4 (R. 2 95). "The County did so in its Answer 
to Amended Complaint, p. 4 ,(R. 367), yet it failed to identify 
any applicable administrative process. 
The County, has identified no statute, ordinance, rule or 
2 3 
33-1 to -15 (1953 as amended)). The Court of Appeals remanded 
for the lower court to determine if the County had violated 
provisions of the County Personnel Management Act. The lower 
court found, on remand, that the County had indeed violated the 
Act and "had improperly considered factors beyond those 
enumerated in the Act in terminating Thurston." Thurston II, 8 92 
P.2d at 1037.15 
Similar to Court of Appeals in Horn, the Utah Supreme Court 
in Thurston never indicated that the appellant failed to state a 
contractual claim. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court confirmed the 
fact that county employees have contractual rights subject to or 
augmented by statutory provisions. 
These cases stand for the proposition, that Plaintiff-
Officers herein are contractual employees with rights that are 
either augmented or limited by statutory or constitutional 
regulation which requires employees to go through an administra-
tive process when making a wage or contractual claim against the 
County. 2nd Depo. of Biesele, p. 36:14-20 (R. 695); p. 38:17-20 
(R. 695); p. 39:16-21 (R. 696); Depo. of County, p. 24:13-17 (R. 
706). The County has not identified any rules or regulations 
that would deny the court jurisdiction by failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. Depo. of County, p. 26:2-5 (R. 706); p. 
32:8 to p. 33:19 (R. 708). 
15
 Thurston appealed a second time seeking reinstatement of 
his job. The County also appealed claiming that Box Elder was 
not subject to the County Personnel Management Act. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Utah held that under the "law of the case" 
doctrine, it would not reconsider the issue raised by the County. 
Thurston II, 892 P.2d at 1037-1039. The Court also held that the 
lower court did not abuse its discretion by refusing reinstate-
ment . 
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provisions. See Weese v. Davis County Comm'n, 8 34 P.2d 1, 3 
(Utah 1992) ie ("Any contract between [county employees] and the 
county is subject to the statutory and constitutional limitations 
on the county as a governing body ' ) . The statutory and 
c o n t r a c t u a 1 r i g I I 1: s o f s t a t e e i i i, p 1 o y e e s a r e c o i I c o i n i t a i I t . 
The court must look to the right that is being enforced to see 
w h e t h e r a s t a 1: u 1: : r y : r c :> I I1: r a c 11 i a ] a i I a 1 y s i s a p p 1 i e s E " • : • i : 
example, Plaintiff-Officers are subject to statutory limitations 
when the county cannot (or does not) fui id merit pay increases for 
a particular year. Weese, 834 P.2d at 3. Plaintiff-Officers are 
subject to statutory limitations should the county re-evaluate a 
particular job or perform a county-wide reassessment of a 1.1 j obs . 
Thurston I & II, Termination of state employment is subject to 
s t a t u t • :) r y r e • g i 11 a 1: i • :> i I , a i i • :I a d m i i I i s t r a t :i v e p r o c e d u r e . Horn. C • :D u I I t y 
commissions cannot enter into contracts guaranteeing future wage 
i n c r e a s e s f < : J : enip.1 oyees . W e es< 5; I J t a 1: Coi Ist. a rt, XIV, § 3 A 
county cannot enter into a contract guaranteeing future or 
c o i I 1 i n I I e d e n: i/[ > 2 o y in e n t 1 J1 a 1: ,. C < ) i I s t a r t:, X I ^  7, § 3 . Ever y contract 
entered with Salt Lake County must be ii i writing. Salt Lake 
16
 In Weese, this Court had the opportunity to adopt ai id 
recite the "statutory employee" general premise. However, this 
Court declined to do so, and relied instead upon Utah law which 
prohibits one governmental administration from spending the next 
administrations' funds. S^e Weese, 834 P.2d at 4 (holding that 
any promise of future raises is beyond the authority of a county 
commission, therefore, the commission could not have entered into 
any agreement as to future raises). 
2 5 
County Ordinance § 2.04.100. Finally, any contract entered 
beyond the authority granted to a County is null and void. 
Weese. 
The foregoing cases never held that county employees do not 
have contractual employment or contractual employment rights. No 
statutory or constitutional provisions force Plaintiff-Officers 
to work uncompensated. Plaintiff-Officers' individual hourly 
rates and job levels are set not by statute, but rather by the 
written agreements between employee and employer. The employment 
agreements between Plaintiff-Officers and Salt Lake County were 
that plaintiffs would be paid a set hourly rate for all time 
worked and when a Plaintiff-Officer worked more than a scheduled 
shift he/she was to be compensated either with time off during 
that pay period ("schedule adjustment") or additional pay. 
Interr. Hudson, p. 4, 1 3 (R. 685). Plaintiff-Officers never 
agreed to work for Salt Lake County without compensation. Id., 
p. 5, 1 5 (R. 686). Furthermore, Salt Lake County prohibits 
Plaintiff-Officers from voluntarily working without pay. 3rd 
Depo. of Cunningham, p. 8:4-16 (R. 715); Depo. of County, p. 6:2-
3 (R. 701). Therefore, this Court should determine Plaintiff-
Officers' wage claim is based upon the written contracts of the 
parties. 
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1 1 1
 THE RULES, POLICIES, PROCEDURES, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES 
OF THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE ESTABLISH THAT PLAINTIFF-OFFICERS 
SHOULD BE PAID FOR THE UNCOMPENSATED BRIEFINGS. 
The decision to require staff members to attend briefings 
and not pay for that ti me was a jail commanders'" decision. £)ep0, 
of County, j: ] ] i 5 1 ] (R. 7 0 2 ) ; p . 14 : 5 1 0 (R 7 03 ) . The 
decision was an erroneous interpretation by the jaiJ commanders 
of the rules, po 1 icies, procedures, reg u 1 ati oi Is ai i.d pract:i ces : f 
the sheriff's office. Aff. of 3iesele, 11/21/1996, 1 12 (R 
7 3 0 ) ' r 1: I a t: e r r : i I e o i i s d e c i s i c : r I ; a s i I c t a p o J i • :: ] : • r :I e c i s i o n • : • f 
the Legislature, the County, the Sheriff nor of the County 
Commi ssi on. 2nd Depo of Bi esel e, p, 1 ; :9-24 (R. 692); p. 28:21 
to p. 29:6 i . 6 93) "Nothing ii i the statutory or policy scheme 
allows Salt Lake County to force Plaintiff-Officers to work 
uncompensated. 
Salt Lake County has admitted its error. It stated: 
It was determined that Roll Call briefings were 
inappropriately being treated as de minimis. We 
voluntarily corrected our policy, We chose to go 
back two years [to February 1, 1994] and pay our 
employees for all shift briefings . . . . because of 
the erroneous use of de minimis in this case, and to 
send a message to our employees that we intend to 
compensat e for all t ime worked . 
Defendant's Answers to Interr. pp. 5-6, 1 9 (R. 673-674). The 
County corrected 1:1 Ie ei • r• : :i * ai I :i i :et roa : t i - 'e] y 1 : a< ::I : 1: : F e b i i,~ 1 , 
1994, paid most jail staff and class members for the briefing 
1 l lilt J v, ; t kt-:'. I . 
Salt Lake County admits the failure to pay Plaintiff-
Officers for the briefing time was an error. The failure to pay 
was not a sheriff's office policy, nor a county policy, nor a 
county commission policy. There is no statutory basis for the 
failure to pay Plaintiff-Officers. No statute mandated non-
payment of Plaintiff-Officers.17 Rather, the failure to pay 
Plaintiff-Officers was an admitted error solely made by the jail 
commanders. Therefore, under the County rules, policies, 
procedures, regulations and practices of the sheriff's office, 
plaintiffs should have been paid for the briefings. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS-OFFICERS' CLAIMS ARE WITHIN THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
The lower court's erroneous determination that Plaintiff-
Officers were "statutory employees" rather than contractual 
employees lead to further harm and misconstruction when the court 
was called upon to determine, a second time, the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (2) (1953 as amended) provides 
that an action must be brought within six (6) years upon any 
contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in 
writing. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (4) (1953 as amended) 
17
 Similarly, no statute mandates payment of the briefing 
time. That is a contractual obligation. 
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provides that an action must be brought within three (3) years 
for a liability created by the statutes of this state. 
The lower court granted partial summary judgment the first 
time on February 26, 1998 and determined that Plaintiff-Officers 
were employees with written employment contracts. Order Granting 
Partial Summary Judgment, p. 3 (R. 294), Attachment "C" attached. 
Therefore, the court determined under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 
(2) (1953 as amended), the applicable limitation period was six 
(6) years. Id. 
The second time the trial court considered the matter, the 
court reversed itself and determined that the Plaintiff-Officers 
were not employees based upon written employment contracts. 
Instead, they were "statutory employees." Order on Motions for 
Summary Judgment, p. 2 (R. 1458), Attachment "D" attached. The 
court, by implication, also determined that "written employment 
contracts'7 and the status of "statutory employee" were mutually 
exclusive. Id. 
Having found that Plaintiff-Officers were "statutory 
employees", the lower court then invoked Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
26 (4) (1953 as amended) as the relevant statute of limitations, 
thereby barring Plaintiff-Officers' claims prior to July 1994. 
The lower court erred in finding that the relevant statute of 
limitations is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (4) (1953 as amended). 
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That section provides: 
An action may be brought within three years: 
* • * 
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this 
state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the 
laws of this state, except where in special cases a 
different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of 
this state . . . . 
Id. 
That statute does not apply to wage claims or actions upon 
employment contracts. A review of the cases that have applied 
that section shows it applies to statutorily and government 
created obligations such as Workers' Compensation claims (Utah 
Consol. Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 279, 194 P. 657 
(Utah 1920); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 
170, 278 P. 60 (Utah 1929)); claims by government agencies 
(Parker v. Weber County Irrigation Dist., 68 Utah 472, 251 P. 11 
(Utah 1926)); claims under Utah's Blue Sky Law (Wilson v. 
Guaranteed Sec. Co., 73 Utah 157, 272 P. 946 (Utah 1928)); claims 
by county officials (Box Elder County v. Harding, 83 Utah 386, 28 
P.2d 601 (Utah 1934)); and certain liabilities to the Utah State 
Tax Commission (In re Swan's Estate, 95 Utah 408, 79 P.2d 999 
(Utah 1938)). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (4) (1953 as amended) applies to 
"a liability created by the statutes of this state." No statute 
of this state creates the liability of Salt Lake County to pay 
wages to the Plaintiff-Officers. The liability or obligation of 
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the County to pay wages is based upon the employment contracts 
between the County and the Plaintiff-Officers. The lower court's 
invocation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (4) (1953 as amended) is 
not supported by any case law or authority. Plaintiffs' claims, 
based upon contract, are subject to a six (6) year statute of 
limitations. See Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, p. 3 
(R. 294); Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (2) (1953 as amended). 
Plaintiff-Officers' claims to July 16, 1991 are within the limit. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Wherefore, this Court should determine that the documents 
presented by Plaintiff-Officers establish written employment 
contracts; that Plaintiff-Officers were employees of Salt Lake 
County based upon written employment contracts thereby subjecting 
their wage claims to a six-year statute of limitations; and 
remand the case below for an accounting of wages owed to named 
plaintiffs and plaintiff class. 
& day of FEBRUARY 2001. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS 
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The determination of these issues will affect the rights of 
many employees of Salt Lake County. This action presents 
important questions with regard to the rights of governmental 
employees. The appellants believes that oral argument will give 
the parties a beneficial opportunity to explain their respective 
positions and to answer questions from the Court. 
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ATTACHMENT A 
Amended Complaint, dated April 21, 1998 (R. 332). 
USB # 0215 
USB # 7205 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
ANDREA J. GARLAND 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for NAMED PLAINTIFFS 
& PLAINTIFF CLASS 
214 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
GREG F. KNIGHT, STEVE HALL, 
ROY NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON, 
personally and on behalf of a 
class of persons similarly 
situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a 
governmental entity, 
Defendant. 
A M E N D E D 
C O M P L A I N T 
Case No. 97-090-7950 CV 
(Judge David Young) 
The named plaintiffs, GREG F. KNIGHT, STEVE HALL, ROY NEIZER 
and BROCK HUDSON, by and through counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD and 
ANDREA J. GARLAND of the UTAH LEGAL CLINIC, personally and behalf 
of a class of similarly situated persons, as a complaint and as a 
cause of action allege and state as follows: 
n n Q Q O 
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
1. Named plaintiffs, GREG F. KNIGHT, STEVE HALL, ROY NEIZER 
and BROCK HUDSON former or current employees of defendant, bring 
this action on their own behalf and on behalf of other current 
and former employees of defendant similarly situated (hereinafter 
the "plaintiff class members"), to recover unpaid and uncredited 
wages and compensatory time under their written employment con-
tracts . 
II. JURISDICTION & VENUE 
2. Venue is proper in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County and the State of Utah. Named plaintiffs 
are residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. The events giving rise 
to this action took place in Salt Lake County, Utah. The work 
performed for which plaintiffs and plaintiff class members were 
not compensated occurred in Salt Lake County. The defendant 
government entity is located in Salt Lake County. Venue is 
proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-4 (1953 as amended). 
3. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3-4 (1953 as amended). 
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4. This is an action on written contracts against a govern-
mental entity. This action and the claims herein are not subject 
to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Ut. Code Ann. § 63-30-5 
(1953 as amended). 
III. PARTIES 
5. Named plaintiffs, GREG F. KNIGHT, STEVE HALL, ROY 
NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON are current or former employees of the 
defendant Salt Lake County, who in the past worked as staff 
members in the Salt Lake County Metro Jail and/or Oxbow Jail. 
6. Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY is a government entity 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, 
having its principal office and place of business in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 
At all times pertinent herein, defendant Salt Lake County was 
responsible for operating the Salt Lake County Metro and Oxbow 
Jails. At all times pertinent, defendant Salt Lake County 
employed the named plaintiffs and plaintiff class members in the 
operations of the Salt Lake County Metro and Oxbow Jails. 
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IV. FACTS 
7. At all times pertinent herein, Salt Lake County was 
engaged in the operation of two (2) detention and correctional 
facilities located in Salt Lake County, Utah and known as the 
Salt Lake County Metro Jail and Oxbow Jail. 
8. During the period from April 15, 1986 to approximately 
November, 1995 inclusive, or during portions of that period, 
defendant employed named plaintiffs and plaintiff class members 
in various occupations and positions as staff members in 
connection with operating the Salt Lake County Metro Jail and 
Oxbow Jail. 
9. The periods of employment of named plaintiffs as 
correctional officers and jail staff members are: 
GREG F. KNIGHT 
February, 1989 through January, 1993 
STEVE HALL 
February, 1977 through February, 1995 
ROY NEIZER 
June, 1991 through April, 1995 
and 
BROCK HUDSON 
January, 1990 through October, 1993. 
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10. The named plaintiffs and plaintiff class members are or 
were employees of defendant Salt Lake County and their claims 
against the defendant are based upon written employment con-
tracts . 
11. During the time period from April 15, 1986 to 
-November, 1995, defendant required named plaintiffs and 
plaintiff class members to arrive and to report for work ten (10) 
minutes early for briefing or roll call (hereinafter "briefing 
time") before the beginning of every assigned regular work shift. 
Named plaintiffs and the members of the plaintiff class were 
compelled by the defendant, its agents and officers to work for 
an extra uncompensated ten (10) minutes per assigned shift in the 
Metro or Oxbow Jail in attending that mandatory uncompensated 
briefing time. 
12. The named plaintiffs and plaintiff class members were 
not paid nor compensated for the ten (10) minute briefing time 
they worked before each work shift prior to November, 1995. 
13. In approximately June, 1996, after defendant was sued 
by the named plaintiffs herein, defendant paid all plaintiff 
class members, in wages for the uncompensated briefing time 
worked after February 1, 1994. Plaintiffs1 claims herein are for 
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wages and/or compensatory time for the uncompensated briefing 
time worked prior to February 1, 1994 by plaintiff class members. 
Named plaintiffs1 claims herein are for wages and/or compensatory 
time for the uncompensated briefing time they worked prior to 
February 1, 1994. 
14. The named plaintiffs and plaintiff class members were 
never given credit as compensatory time for the ten (10) minute 
briefing time before each work shift prior to November, 1995. 
15. As used in this Complaint, the term "compensatory time" 
is time off work with pay in an amount equal to the time worked. 
That time is credited hour-for-hour for the time worked and not 
at a premium rate (i.e., time and a half). Salt Lake County 
Deputy Sheriff's Merit Service Commission ("DSMSC"), Policy # 
5105 
16. From April 15, 1986 through and including November, 
1995, the policies of the Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff1s Merit 
Service Commission ("DSMSC"), Policy # 5105, allowed plaintiff 
class members to receive and accumulate "compensatory time." 
17. Defendant in approximately April, 1995, acting by and 
through the Salt Lake County Sheriff and his department dis-
continued its practice of allowing jail employees and members of 
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the plaintiff class to accrue and use compensatory time. After 
April, 1995 plaintiff class members who worked more than their 
regularly scheduled shift/hours are to be compensated by payment 
of wages for the additional time worked. 
18. After April 15, 1986 defendant subjected and continue 
to subject the named plaintiffs and plaintiff class members to 
disciplinary action if they were not present for the briefing 
time before each assigned work shift. 
19. The uncompensated briefing time required of the named 
plaintiffs and plaintiff class members prior to November, 1995 
was neither de minimis, occasional nor sporadic. 
20. The ten (10) minutes uncompensated briefing time 
required of the named plaintiffs and plaintiff class members was 
easily computed, recorded and subject to easy book keeping pro-
cedures. 
21. In approximately November, 1995, defendant changed its 
policy as to payment of wages for the briefing time. Currently 
and since approximately November, 1995, jail staff members are 
required to report fifteen (15) minutes before their regular 
assigned shift for briefing time. Jail staff members are now 
compensated with pay for the additional mandatory briefing time. 
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22. Based upon their written employment contracts, the 
named plaintiffs and plaintiff class members are entitled to 
compensation as available in compensatory time or wages for the 
uncompensated briefing time they worked as set forth above. 
23. Named plaintiffs who are no longer employed by the 
defendant are entitled to cash payment (a "cash out") re-
presenting their compensatory time accrued between April 15, 1986 
and November, 1995. Plaintiff class members who are no longer 
employed by the defendant are entitled to cash payment (a "cash 
out") representing the earned wages and/or compensatory time 
accrued between April 15, 1986 and November, 1995. Plaintiff 
class members currently employed by the defendant are entitled to 
a cash payment (a "cash out") representing the earned wages 
and/or compensatory time accrued between April 15, 1986 and 
November, 1995 or compensatory time off accrued between April 15, 
1986 and November, 1995. 
V. CLASS REPRESENTATION 
24. Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 the 
named plaintiffs desire to serve as representatives of a class of 
persons. That class is defined as all jail staff employees of 
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the defendant during the time period of April 15, 1986 to 
February 1, 1994 inclusive, who were required to report to work 
at the Salt Lake County Metro or Oxbow Jails ten (10) or more 
minutes before their assigned work shifts for briefing time and 
who did not receive compensation (wages or compensatory time) 
from the defendant for that time worked. 
25. Named plaintiffs believe and allege that there are 
approximately one hundred and forty (-140) current employees of 
the defendant that serve as jail staff in the Metro or Oxbow 
Jails. A large portion of these persons would be within the 
class of persons similarly situated to the named plaintiffs and 
members of the class proposed herein. 
26. Named plaintiffs believe and allege that there are more 
than two hundred (200+) former employees of the defendant who 
served as jail staff in the Metro or Oxbow Jails during the time 
period April 15, 1986 through February 1, 1994. These persons 
would be within the class of persons similarly situated to the 
named plaintiffs and members of the class proposed herein. 
27. The members of the plaintiff class number in the 
hundreds and thus are too numerous to join as individual 
plaintiffs in this action. Rule 23(a)(1), Ut. R. Civ. Pro. 
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27. As contemplated in Rule 23(a) (2-4), Ut. R. Civ. Pro., 
questions of law pertaining to the unpaid wages and/or 
compensatory time are common to the class, the named plaintiffs' 
claims are typical of the class claims and the named plaintiffs 
will adequately and fairly protect the interests of the class. 
28. The defendant, its officers and agents have refused to 
pay or compensate the members of the plaintiff class for work 
done based upon a consistent long term policy of defendant, 
thereby making appropriate final relief as under Rule 23(b)(2), 
Ut. R. Civ. Pro. 
28. Claims of individual plaintiffs and class members are 
of such amounts that absent a class action, pursuit of the 
claims, by individuals may not be economically feasible. 
29. Pursuit of this action as a plaintiff class, is the 
most reasonable, judicially economic and expeditious method of 
resolution of the claims of the plaintiff class members. 
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
29. Under the court's equitable power and in the interests 
of justice and equity, the court may and should award reasonable 
attorney fees to counsel for the named plaintiffs. 
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30. All class members will be financially benefitted as a 
result of the efforts of the named plaintiffs and their counsel, 
thus an award of attorney fees is warranted, appropriate and 
authorized by Utah law. 
VII. RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, named plaintiffs re-
spectfully request that this court: 
1. Enter a declaratory judgment against defendant deter-
mining the time amounts accrued and due as wages and/or 
compensatory time to each named plaintiff and plaintiff class 
member for unpaid wages earned during the briefing periods worked 
for the time period April 15, 1986 through and including 
November, 1995, or for such period and in such amounts as allowed 
by law; and, order defendant to grant and allow reasonable use of 
that compensatory time to the named plaintiffs and plaintiff 
class members, who remain employees of the defendant; or in the 
alternative, in light of defendant's current policy (post April, 
1995) of not allowing compensatory time, ordering defendant to 
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"cash out" plaintiff class members for their accumulated wages 
and/or compensatory time; 
2. Order defendant to pay ("cash out") all former employees 
within plaintiff class (including the named plaintiffs) all 
accumulated wages and/or compensatory time due and owing as of 
the date of the termination of that former employee; enter a 
monetary judgment against defendant in the amounts respectively 
due named plaintiffs and plaintiff class members for "cash out" 
amounts owed for the time period April 15, 1986 through and 
including November, 1995; 
3. Award to plaintiffs' counsel reasonable attorney fees 
for the prosecution of this action as provided for by Utah case 
law and the equitable powers of this court. Stewart v. Utah, 885 
P.2d 759, (Ut. 1994); Plumb v. State of Utah, 809 P.2d 734, 739-
40 (Ut. 1990); 
4. Allow the named plaintiffs to represent a class of 
persons similarly situated in this action under Rule 23 Ut. R. 
Civ. Pro.; 
5. Award plaintiffs their court costs incurred herein; and, 
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6. Grant such other relief as the Court deems fair and just 
in the premises. 
DATED this *• i day of APRIL, 1998. 
lit3\Kmgamnd CMPNajg 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for PLAINTIFFS 
by k id lA/J&JUjtd 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
ANDREA J. GARLAND 
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ATTACHMENT B 
Amended Answer, dated June 29, 1998 (364). 
DOUGLAS R. SHORT (#5344) 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RENA BECKSTEAD (#5033) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREG F. KNIGHT, STEVE HALL, ROY 
NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON, personally I ANSWER TO 
and on behalf of a class of persons similarly AMENDED COMPLAINT 
situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
Civil No. 97-090-7950 CV 
-vs-
Judge David Young 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a governmental 
entity, 
Defendant. 
Salt Lake County, by and through Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney Rena Beckstead, 
answers the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Defendant answers the specific allegations as follows: 
1. Admit the named plaintiffs are or have been employed by the defendant. The 
defendant is without information as to whether they bring this action for others and therefore 
^-,-^-."i\'i__ 
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denies that allegation. The defendant denies that the named plaintiffs are entitled to 
compensatory time and denies that a written contract exists between the parties. 
2. Admits that venue is proper if this Court has jurisdiction but denies that work 
performed was not compensated for by the defendant. 
3. Deny. 
4. Admits that this is an action on written contract but denies that a written contract 
exists between the parties. Denies that the action is not subject to the Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
5. Admit. 
6. Admits the allegations of paragraph six except denies that there are plaintiff class 
members in this action. 
7. Admit. 
8. Admits that the named plaintiffs were employed by the defendant but denies there 
are class members in this action. 
9. Admit. 
10. Admit that the plaintiffs are or were employees of the defendant and that they are 
alleging a claim on written contract but denies that a written contract exists and denies there are 
class members. 
11. Deny. 
12. Deny. 
00365 
13. Defendant admits that plaintiff Hall filed a federal action in February of 1996 and 
that plaintiffs Nizer and Hudson later joined that lawsuit. Defendant denies the balance of the 
allegations. 
14. Defendant admits that compensatory time was not credited but alleges there was 
no duty to do so. 
15. Defendant denies that the policy cited contains any such definition of 
compensatory time. 
16. Admits that the DSMC policy allowed compensatory time but denies that the 
Defendant or its policy allowed compensatory time. 
17. Deny. 
18. Admits that plaintiffs were subject to discipline action but denies that it was prior 
to their assigned work time. 
19. Admits that the briefing period was neither occasional nor sporadic but denies 
that it was not de minimus. 
20. Admits. 
21. Admits that the jail employees are compensated for their briefing period but 
denies the remainder of the allegation. 
22. Deny. 
23. Deny. 
24. Deny for lack of knowledge. 
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25. Deny for lack of knowledge. 
26. Deny for lack of knowledge. 
27. Deny for lack of knowledge. 
28. Deny. 
29. Deny for lack of knowledge. 
29. Admits that the Court may award fees but denies that fees should be awarded. 
30. Deny. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The claims brought herein are barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
The claims brought herein are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. The 
plaintiffs have fully been compensated in accordance with all applicable statutes and policies and 
procedures. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
The plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. 
SDCTH DEFENSE 
The defendant does not have a contractual relationship with its employees. The 
employment relationship is statutory and is controlled by the County Employee Management Act 
nn^R7 
17-33-1 et sep. or the Deputy Merit Sheriffs Merit Service Commission Act 17-30-1 et seq. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act 63-30-1 et seq the 
defendant is immune. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
This action is barred by the statute of limitations. 
Defendant, having fully answered the amended complaint, demands: 
1. That this action be dismissed with prejudice. 
2. That the plaintiffs take nothing thereby. 
3. That attorney fees be awarded to the defendant for the costs of defense of this 
frivilous action. 
4. Any and all relief this court deems fair and just. 
Dated this 29th day of June, 1998. 
DOUGLAS R. SHORT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
RENA BECKSTEAD 
Deputy County Attorney 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the 29th day of June, 1998 I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing amended answer to be mailed by first class mail postage prepaid to: Brian Barnard, 
Attorney at Law, 214 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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ATTACHMENT C 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, 
dated February 26, 1998 (R. 292). 
Ttord Judicial Dtotrtet 
FEB 2 6 1998 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
ANDREA J. GARLAND USB # 7205 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for NAMED PLAINTIFFS 
Sc PLAINTIFF CLASS 
214 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
Oepufc *y 
GREG F. KNIGHT, STEVE HALL, 
ROY NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON, 
personally and on behalf of a 
class of persons similarly 
situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a 
governmental entity, 
Defendant. 
ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS, 
DETERMINING STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS and 
GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 97-090-7950 CV 
(Judge David Young) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court for 
hearing on four (4) motions by named plaintiffs, GREG F. KNIGHT, 
STEVE HALL, ROY NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON, by and through counsel, 
BRIAN M. BARNARD and ANDREA J. GARLAND of the UTAH LEGAL CLINIC, 
personally and behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, 
the hearing being held pursuant to notice on Friday, February 6, 
1998, at 8:30 o'clock a.m., the Hon. David Young, judge presid-
ing, plaintiffs appearing by and through counsel as noted above, 
.-*. >«* *-\ **\ t^. 
the defendant appearing by and through Brendan McCullagh, Special 
Deputy County Attorney, the Court having reviewed the file and 
the pleadings therein and having heard the arguments and 
representations of counsel, based thereon and for good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
Class Certification 
1. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted. 
Named plaintiffs shall represent a plaintiff class pursuant to 
Ut. R. Civ. Pro. 23 (b)(1) & (2). That class shall be defined 
as: All jail staff employees of the defendant during 
the time period of April 15, 1986 to February 1, 
1994 inclusive, who were required to report to 
work at the Salt Lake County Metro or Oxbow Jails 
ten (10) or more minutes before their assigned 
work shifts for briefing time and who did not 
receive compensation (wages or compensatory time) 
from the defendant for that time worked. 
2. The defendant has not opposed this class certification. 
The Court finds that all of the requirements of Rule 23 (b)(1) & 
(2) have been meet and that the facts relative to class certifi-
cation as set out in Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts 
(HH 5, 8, 2 4 - 3 3 ) are not disputed and are true and sufficient 
to support class certification. 
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3. Any issues with regard to notice, etc. to the class (Ut. 
R. Civ. Pro. 23(c)) are reserved and may be considered at a later 
date. 
Applicable Statute of Limits 
4. The applicable statute of limitations in this action is 
six (6) years because plaintiffs' claims are based upon written 
contracts pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (1953 as amend-
ed) . The applicable time period runs from July 16, 1997 when 
plaintiffs initially filed suit and requested the relief sought 
herein. 
Judgment on the Pleadings 
5. Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings should 
be granted in part and denied in part as follows: 
A. Plaintiffs' request that the Court rule on the merits of 
Defendant's first affirmative defense (1. The complaint fails to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.) is denied. 
B. Plaintiffs' request that the Court rule on the merits of 
Defendant's third affirmative defense (3. Defendant has fully 
compensated plaintiffs in accordance with all applicable statutes 
and policies and procedures.) is denied. 
C. Plaintiffs' request that the Court rule on the merits of 
Defendant's fourth affirmative defense (4. Because plaintiffs 
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, this Court is 
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without jurisdiction to entertain this suit.) is granted. The 
defendant has not set out any applicable administrative remedies 
or procedures. Therefore the Court finds and determines that 
plaintiffs' claims are not barred by any failure to exhaust any 
administrative remedies. Defendant may raise this defense again 
by setting out any administrative remedies it deems applicable. 
D. Plaintiffs' request that the Court rule on the merits of 
Defendant's fifth affirmative defense (5. Defendant asserts that 
its relationship with its employees is not one of contract, but 
rather one of statute and is controlled by the provision of 
either the County Employee Management Act, Utah Code Annotated 
§17-33-1 et seg., or the Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Service 
Commission Act §17-30-1 et seq. whichever is applicable.) is 
denied. 
E. Plaintiffs' request that the Court rule on the merits of 
Defendant's sixth affirmative defense (6. Plaintiffs' claims are 
barred by the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated §63-
30-1 et seq.) is granted. The Court finds and determines that 
because this is an action in contract, it is not governed nor 
barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
F. Plaintiffs' request that the Court rule on the merits of 
Defendant's seventh affirmative defense (7. Under the provision 
of Utah Code Annotated §63-30-13, the plaintiffs' claims are 
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untimely and therefore this Court should dismiss those claims 
because any notice plaintiffs could file is deficient because it 
would be filed more than one (1) year after a claim arose. See 
Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994).) is granted. 
The Court finds and determines that this action in contract 
required no notice under the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Partial Summary Judgment 
6. The Court grants a partial summary judgment to the 
plaintiffs. The Court finds and determines that during the 
relevant time period: 
A. The named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class were 
employees of the defendant, Salt Lake County based upon written 
employment contracts. 
B. The named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class members 
were each required to attend a briefing session ten (10) minutes 
before every regularly assigned work shifts. 
C. The named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class members 
were subject to discipline by defendant if they failed to attend 
or were late in attending the briefing session ten (10) minutes 
before every regularly assigned shifts. 
D. The other issues raised by plaintiffs in their motion 
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for partial summary judgment are reserved for further hearing 
and/or trial. 
DATED this 26 day of FEBRUARY, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID YO 
JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS, DETERMINING 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS and GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT to: 
DOUG SHORT 
BRENDAN McCULLAGH 
RENA BECKSTEAD 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State Street 
South Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
on the 10TH day of FEBRUARY, 1998, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
C \REGCASEWILLALOB\CLASSETC ORD\BMB\ 
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Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, 
dated October 4, 2000 (R. 1457). 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
JOHN P. SOLTIS (3040) 
VALERIE M. WILDE (7345) 
Deputy District Attorneys 
2001 South State Street, Suite S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801)468-3421 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
B y - J ^ — 
OCT 0 k 2000 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREG F. KNIGHT, STEVE HALL, ROY 
NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON, 
personally and on behalf of a class of 
persons similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a governmental 
entity, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 97-090-7950CV 
Judge David Young 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 18th day of April, 2000, 
before the honorable David S. Young, Judge of the above-entitled Court. Both 
parties, through their respective counsel, had previously filed competing Motions 
for Summary Judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiffs and the class members 
were statutory or contractual employees. Prior to the start of trial, each party 
argued their motions to the Court. The Court being fully aware of the facts and 
positions of the parties and advised in the premises, now issues its: 
01457 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The documents presented by Plaintiffs to establish their written 
employment contracts with Salt Lake County are contained in footnote 6, on 
page 4 of Plaintiffs Reply in Further Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
These documents do not establish a written employment contract between the 
parties. 
2. Plaintiffs are statutory employees appointed under Utah Code Ann. 
§17-31-1 et seq. to career service or Utah Code Ann. §17-33-1 et seq. to 
classified service. As such, a three year statute of limitations pursuant to §78-12-
26(4) is applicable for liabilities created by the statutes of this state. 
3. Paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment indicates 
that Plaintiffs request compensation for time worked prior to February 1, 1994. 
Paragraph 13 of the Plaintiffs1 Amended Complaint admits payment for the period 
covered by a three year statute of limitations. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the 
Court hereby makes the following ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are statutory employees appointed under Utah Code Ann. 
§17-30-1 et seq. to career service or Utah Code Ann. §17-33-1 et seq. to 
classified service. 
2. As statutory employees, Plaintiffs are governed by the three year 
statute of limitations pursuant to §78-12-26(4). 
m 
3. Plaintiffs admit compensation for the statutory period beginning on 
November 17, 1994 and continuing to November 17,1997 and thus, there are no 
further triable issues to present to the Court. 
4. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and 
this matter is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of September, 2000. 
By the Court: .. '."~"~~ •-
DAVID S. Yi 
District Cou 
01 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Brian Barnard 
James Harris, Jr. 
Utah Legal Clinic 
Attorneys for Named Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' class 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3204 
a^dayof Dated this AO^\iay of September, 2000. 
r\ i A o r\ 
ATTACHMENT E 
Attachment "E-l": 
Attachment "E-2": 
Attachment "E-3' 
Letter from Sheriff N.D. "Pete" Hayward to 
Brock E. Hudson, 1/11/90 (R. 130) 
Letter from Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard to Roy 
David Neizer, 6/01/91 (R. 131). 
"Notice of Personnel Action", 1/23/90, 
authorizing employment and compensation of 
Brock E. Hudson (R. 132). 
Attachment "E-4": 
Attachment "E-5' 
"Notice of Personnel Action", 6/19/91, 
authorizing employment and compensation of 
Roy David Neizer (R. 133). 
Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff's Merit 
Service Commission ("DSMSC") Policy and 
Procedure # 5105 (R. 134-140). 
Attachment "E-6' Brock Hudson, 6/20/90 statement that he has 
read and is familiar with Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office Policies and Procedures 
Manual, incident to 1/23/90 action (R. 141), 
SHERIFF'S OFF^E 
S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
437 South Secona East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
January 1 1 , 1990 
N. D. "PETE"HAYWARQ 
SHERIFR 
CHARLES! SHEPHERD 
CHIEF DEPUTY 
3rock E. Hudson 
Dear Mr. Hudson: 
I am p l e a s e d to offer you employment wi th che S a l t Lake County Sher i f f ' s 
Off ice as a J a i l Officer. 
This o f f e r of employment i s c o n d i t i o n a l on your success fu l completion of 
the r e q u i r e d County physical . 
You a r e a s s igned Co report to Lt . Steve Huntsman of the J a i l Administration 
(2nd f l o o r , Metropolitan Hall of J u s t i c e ) a t 0800 hours , on Tuesday, 
January 23 , 1990. 
I a p p r e c i a t e your i n t e r e s t in S h e r i f f ' s Off ice employment and look forward 
to your c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the Off ice . 
S i n c e r e l y , 
N.D. "Pete1 1 Hayvard 
She r i f f 
NTDH/jv 
i VI 
EXHIBIT 
NV
 A 'i 
wrar 
—— " ^ una ~~ " ^ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHERIFFS OFFICE 
\2ion D. Kennard Metropolitan Hail ^  T 
Darreil H. Brady Salt Like Cry, U^Kgf?f 
Robert H. Sundqmst 
2vk* Deputy 
Son J. Sbrong 
IfcirfDtputy 
June 1, 1991 
Roy David Neizer 
Utah 
Dear Mr. Neizer, 
I am pleased to offer you employment with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Offica as a Jail Officer. This offer of employment is conditional on your 
successful completion of the required County physical. 
You are assigned to report to I t . Prescott of the Jail Division at the 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 237 East 400 South at 0800 hours on Wednesday^ 
June 19. 1991. 
I appreciate your interest in Sheriff's Offica employment and look forward to 
your contributions to our effort. 
Sincerely, 
£X^L*^<**~~ ^ ^ L ^ ^ 
Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard 
A D K : L H 
0467J 
8ectM Offlcs / Qrvision Nam« anc Numo«r 
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'RAD (New Hire) 
>RUD (Rehi re)
 f 
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>RUD (New & A d j u s t e d Sa ianes) EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS 
>RTH (Termination) JOB TITLE Corrections Of f i ce r 17
 ACTI0N. 1/23/10 
T3o7 "W" 
"US Social S«cunty Numo«r 
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PART TIME 
NAME KU?S0N, Brock E 
M«cdi» miL 
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PHONE 
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RETIREMENT 
MARITAL STATUS 
S G SINGLE 
M UNMARRIED 
MERIT 
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N C NO 
LEAVE WITHOUT PAY 
Mo. Oy. Yr 
HANDICAP 
Y C YES r2^ 
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Mo. Oy. Yr 
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Y Q YES 
N t i l NO 
APPLYING FOR 
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• Y 
ALARY CHANGE L - NO SALAR> 
SALARY ADVANCEMENT 
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C OTHER ADJUSTMENT 
CHANGE OF CLASSIFICATION 
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S 
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1 
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AMOUNT S . 
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C DEMOTION 
G RECLASSIFICATION 
G CAREER LADDER 
G OTHER 
Date of Allocation Letter. .OR 
Name or Person Reolaced and Date Vacated . ^ Fred Ross Tarn. l/15/°0 
TERMINATION . 
Coos 0 (00 OR 10) 
VACATION LEAVE HOURS TO BE PAID . 
. LAST WORK DAY . _ R E A S O N . 
Numoer of Hours 
SICK LEAVE HOURS TO BE PAID (Reursss Gnry) 
30 DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE 
. A T S . 
. A T S , 
^umtMf at Hours 
8 HOURS AT 5 . 
tARKS 
-4^4 
PER HOUR TOTAL S. 
PER HOUR TOTAL S. 
PER HOUR TOTAL S . 
GRAND TOTAL S . 
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14/tA 
Cotimv Pmonrm 
ROVAL OF A Y A U ^ S I t n ^ O F UNENCUMBERED FUNDS 
County Auo/tor 
^ ^ a O A R O OF COUNTY COMMISSION ACTION 
APPROVED / ^ 7 rf . 
Commission v^ r^x >-. OENIED 
DATE 
DATE. 
DATE. 
A5/-^-
-*- i-'^y 
^ART 5AHKLH 
Commtssionsr 
. TGM SHIMIZU 
Commentonvr 
nQiniNATTnw OPPT-PPTT iPNFn P P P M C! ERK'S 0FHCE 
Otnsr Signature & Date 
DATE 
1 / 
3RAO (New Hire) 
=>RUO (Renire) 
3RUD (Feid Change, Transfer) NAME 
3 RU0 (New & Adjusted Salaries) 
3RTH (Termination) JOB TITLE 
NO .J£ OP PERSONNEL ACTk 
Roy 0 Heizer 
Cor rec t ions O f f i c e r 1 7 
^nerrrT 1 1^ 20 
3ectea Office / Qiviswn same ana ^ 
'umo^f 
Section 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS 
ACTION: <X 5 / 1 9 / 9 7 
~13a - , - —• 
t j o Social Secunry Numoer 
REGULAR 93 D INTERN 
ME^IT ^CBATION 94 C RESERVE DEPUTY 
PROVISIONAL 95 D APPOINTED 
TEMPORARY ' 96 G FEDERAL MANPOWER 
PART ~ME /VITH BENEFITS 97 C ELECTED 
PART TIME WITHOUT BENEFITS 
Agency Organi-sation 
suo. 
Org. Activity Obiect duo. Org. 
110 ' 14-2C C08* * Suo D«ot 
NAME ' J F T 7 ^ , Iny 1 
PHONE 
^ L L TIME RACE 
= EQUIVALENT CCOE 
21 1.00 0 
SEX 
M 2?MAL£ 
F D FEMALE 
MARITAL STATUS 
S G SINGLE 
M O MARRIED 
MERIT 
Y-'S^ES 
N G NO 
IER OF 
NDENTS 
IED 
sD 
F D 
RETIREMENT 
ag 
T H D C 
P D 
N Q N O 
LEAVE WITHOUT PAY 
Mo. Oy. Yr 
HANOICAP 
Y Q YES r^ 
zD Y G GOING ON LEAVE FROM . 
SERVICE
 n - , _ _ „ 
DATE 06 19 9 1 
Mo. Oy. Yr. 
TAX EXEMPT WAGE 
Y G YES 
N CDCNO 
APPLYING FOR 
LONG TERM 
DISABILITY 
REASON . 
N G RETURNING FROM LEAVE ON . 
• Y 
LARY CHANGE NO SALARY CHANGE 
ALARY ADVANCEMENT 
G MERIT INCREASE 
G OTHER ADJUSTMENT 
4ANGE OF CLASSIFICATION 
L i PROMOTION 
G OEMOTION 
C RECLASSIFICATION 
G CAREER LADDER 
G OTHER 
Old flaw ot Pay-«f Any 
s_lSSSJ2Q_ 
Proposed flare 
Percent Increase 
Percent Decrease« 
SALARIED S Q HOURLY H D 
JLZL 
Pay Grace 
ALLOWANCE. JUL 
Houny Rate '. - Pay Rate P«c 
- PayPenod-. 
_ L AMOUNT S 2 1 0 ^ 0 0 ~~ 
Date of Allocation Latter. 
Name of Person Reolaced and Date Vacated __ Scat* Phff Tpffn. 5/31/Q1 
.OR 
"ERMINATION . 
Coae » (00 OR 10) 
ACATION LEAVE HOURS TO BE PAID . 
. LAST WORK OAY . 
ICK LEAVE HOURS TO 8 E PAIO 
l Retirees Onryj 
0 OAYS ADVANCE .NOTICE 
Numoer ot Hours 
.AT S . 
.AT S . 
^umoer at Hours 
3 HOURS AT 3 . 
. R E A S O N . 
*KS 
, PER HOUR TOTAL S . 
PER HOUR TOTAL S . 
PER HOUR TOTAL 5 . 
GRAND TOTAL S . 
meed 3v The elected OfticeiOTvision Namea Above 
\ S~z !»•-/<=! • '•"U\ Sianature of •flecommenaing Officer i Qate ] Other Signature 4 Oate u l i V I U ! \ M U L L • Other Sionature £ Oate 
=D AS ~0 CLASSIFICATION ANO SALARY OATA 
— • idCuntv P«ysonne4 
/AL CF AVAILABIUTY OF UNENCUMBERED FUNOS 
••&aJKs: & *®ife&kiL*
 0ATE. 
Counrv Auditor 
3 O A H 0 OF COUNTY COMMISSION ACTION 
ROVED I (H +£ 
IIED -^ ^ < / ^ .^A^O 
Commission Cleric 
&-//-?/ 
, HATF ^ / _ 
HANDY HOWUS*! 
D. MlGIAtL 2?Hfi«?T 
Commissioner 
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POLICY AND PROCEDURE # 5 1 0 5 
OVERTIME AND COMPENSATORY TIME 
REFERENCE 
SLCPP ^5420 ( 0 4 / 0 8 / 9 2 ) 
F a i r L a b o r S t a n d a r d s Act 
PURPOSE 
To c o m p l y w i t h t h e F a i r Labor S t a n d a r d s A c t and p r o v i d e f o r t h e 
u n i f o r m and e q u i t a b l e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f o v e r t i m e and c o m p e n s a t o r y 
t i m e o f f f o r sworn e m p l o y e e s . 
DEFINITIONS 
A c t u a l H o u r s Worked - I n c l u d e s a l l t i m e t h a t an employee i s 
r e q u i r e d t o be on t h e e m p l o y e r ' s p r e m i s e s , o r a t a p r e s c r i b e d 
w o r k p l a c e f o r t h e e m p l o y e r , and a l l t i m e d u r i n g wh ich t h e e m p l o y e e 
i s s u f f e r e d o r p e r m i t t e d t o work f o r t h e e m p l o y e r . Pa id l e a v e and 
h o l i d a y s a r e n o t h o u r s worked f o r t h e p u r p o s e of c a l c u l a t i n g 
o v e r t i m e . 
C a l l - B a c k - R e f e r s t o i n s t a n c e s w h e r e e m p l o y e e s a r e c a l l e d back t o 
t h e i r work a t t i m e s when t h e y a r e n o t s c h e d u l e d t o work. 
C o m p e n s a t i o n - I n c l u d e s a l l r e m u n e r a t i o n f o r employment p a i d t o an 
e m p l o y e e s u c h a s b o n u s e s , s h i f t d i f f e r e n t i a l s , t h e c o s t o f 
f a c i l i t i e s f u r n i s h e d an e m p l o y e e , a n d o t h e r paymen t s f o r work 
a c t u a l l y p e r f o r m e d i n c l u d i n g c o m p e n s a t o r y t i m e . 
C o m p e n s a t o r y Time Off - C o m p e n s a t i o n i n t h e form of l e a v e w i t h p a y 
t h a t i s a w a r d e d i n l i e u of c a s h p a y m e n t . C o m p e n s a t o r y t ime can be 
a w a r d e d a t e i t h e r a ' ' r e g u l a r r a t e of p a y " ( h o u r f o r hour ) o r a t a n 
o v e r t i m e r a t e ( 1 | h o u r s f o r e a c h h o u r w o r k e d o v e r 40 i n t h e 
s t a n d a r d w o r k w e e k ) . 
EE04 J o b C a t e g o r i e s - Employment d a t a u s e d t o c l a s s i f y e m p l o y e e s 
a c c o r d i n g t o j o b c a t e g o r i e s , i . e . o f f i c i a l s and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ; 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s ; t e c h n i c i a n s ; p r o t e c t i v e s e r v i c e w o r k e r s ; 
p a r a p r o f e s s i o n a l s ; a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s u p p o r t ; s k i l l e d c r a f t w o r k e r s ; 
a n d s e r v i c e a n a m a i n t e n a n c e . 
E m p l o y m e n t R e l a t i o n s h i p - R e f e r s t o an e m p l o y e r and an employee and 
t h e a c t o r c o n d i t i o n of e m p l o y m e n t . 
E m p l o y - I s d e f i n e d as t o s u f f e r o r p e r m i t t o work ; knowledge by an 
e m p l o y e r of work done by an e m p l o y e e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o c r e a t e an 
e m p l o y m e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p u n d e r FLSA. 
E x c e s s H o u r s - Any h o u r s s u b m i t t e d f o r c o m p e n s a t i o n m e x c e s s of 
t h e e m p l o y e e ' s FTE, which does n o t mee t t h e d e f i n i t i o n of o v e r t i m e . 
FLSA - F a i r L a b o r S t a n d a r d s A c t . 
00134 
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FLSA Covered Employees - Those employees covered by the overtime 
and minimum wage provisions of the FLSA. 
FLSA Exempt Employees - Those management, administrative and 
professional employees not covered by the overtime provisions of 
the FLSA. 
FTE - Full time equivalency based on the number of hours an 
employee is regularly scheduled to work in a standard workweek, 
divided by 40 hours (full time). For example: 32 scheduled /40 
full time = .80 FTE. 
Overtime - Hours worked by FLSA covered employees that must be 
compensated at lj times the employee's regular rate of pay, 
pursuant to the FLSA 207(k) exemption. 
Overtime pay - Cash payment of overtime at a rate of lj times the 
employee's regular rate of pay. 
Primary Payroll Unit - The County payroll unit for which an 
employee works the greatest numoer of hours on a regular basis; m 
the event an employee works an equal number of hours for two 
payroll units, the payroll with the earliest hire aate shall be 
considered the primary payroll unit. 
Regular Rate of Pay - The stated rate of pay. 
For employees working 5-2 (8 hour shifts), 7-3, 7-4 (8 hour 
shifts), or 4-3 (10 hour shifts) schedules, salaries paid on the 
half month are multiplied by 24 and the product divided by 2080 to 
arrive at a regular rate of pay as required by the FLSA. 
For employees working any other schedule, salaries paid on the half 
month are multiplied by 24 and the product divided by the average 
numoer of hours required to be worked by that schedule annually to 
arrive at a regular rate of pay as required by the FLSA. 
Schedule Adjustment - Administrative action changing the schedule 
and/or hours to be worked within a work period. 
Total Hours - All hours submitted for pay by an employee. This 
includes actual hours worked (including mandatory training), and 
paid leave (vacation, sick, holiday, military, funeral 
administrative and compensatory time). 
Work Period - Any established and regularly recurring period of 
work which cannot be less than seven (7) consecutive days nor more 
than 28 consecutive days, established by written order of the 
Sheriff. 
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PROCEDURE 
1 • 0 FLSA E m p l o y e e C e r t i f i c a t i o n 
T h e r e a r e two t y p e s of e m p l o y m e n t c l a s s e s i n S a l t Lake C o u n t y 
r e l a t i v e t o FLSA r e q u i r e m e n t s , FLSA e x e m p t and FLSA c o v e r e d . 
FLSA c o v e r e d emp loyees a r e s u b j e c t t o FLSA r e q u i r e m e n t s . 
1 . 1 FLSA exempt e m p l o y e e s a r e g e n e r a l l y t h o s e i n a n 
e x e c u t i v e - , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , p r o f e s s i o n a l , o r o u t s i d e s a l e s 
c a p a c i t y , and m e r i t e x e m p t e m p l o y e e s . These e m p l o y e e s 
w i l l n o r m a l l y be c l a s s i f i e d c a t e g o r y 1 a c c o r d i n g t o t h e 
EE04 d e f i n i t i o n s , c a t e g o r y 1 - o f f i c i a l s and 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ; o r c a t e g o r y 2 - p r o f e s s i o n a l s . 
1.2 FLSA covered employees a r e g e n e r a l l y included in a l l 
o t h e r EE04 c a t e g o r i e s . C a t e g o r y 3 i n c l u d e s t e c h n i c i a n s , 
c a t e g o r y 4 p r o t e c t e d s e r v i c e workers , ca tegory 5 
p a r a p r o f e s s i o n a l s , c a t e g o r y 6 o f f i c e and c l e r i c a l , 
c a t e g o r y 7 s k i l l e d c r a f t w o r k e r s , ca tegory 8 s e r v i c e 
m a i n t e n a n c e . 
1.3 FLSA exempt p o s i t i o n s i n t h e S h e r i f f ' s Office i n c l u d e : 
S h e r i f f (E lec t ed O f f i c i a l ) 
U n d e r s h e r i f f ( P o l i c y making a p p o i n t e e , execut ive) 
Chie f Deputy ( P o l i c y making a p p o i n t e e , execut ive) 
Deputy Capta in ( E x e c u t i v e , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ) 
Deputy L ieu tenan t ( A d m i n i s t r a t i v e ) 
J a i l L ieu tenan t ( A d m i n i s t r a t i v e ) 
1 . 3 . 1 N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s d e s i g n a t i o n , employees i n 
s p e c i f i c a s s i g n m e n t s which do nor meet exempt 
p o s i t i o n c r i t e r i a w i l l be FLSA covered. Such 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i l l be made by a Meri t 
Commission h e a r i n g , upon request of t h e 
e f f e c t e d e m p l o y e e ( s ) o r t h e Sher i f f . 
1.4 FLSA covered p o s i t i o n s i n t h e S h e r i f f ' s Office i n c l u d e : 
Deputy Sergeant 
Deputy Corporal 
Deputy She r i f f 
J a i l Sergeant 
J a i l Corporal 
J a i l Of f i ce r 
B a i l i f f Corporal 
B a i l i f f 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n T e c h n i c i a n 
00 
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2.0 Qualifying Conditions Applying to Overtime Eligibility of Non 
Exempt Employees 
2.1 Holidays, vacation, sick leave and other paid leave such 
as jury duty, military leave and funeral leave shall not 
be counted as time worked for purposes of overtime. 
2.2 FLSA covered employees may be granted compensatory time 
off, in lieu of cash payment for overtime hours worked or 
for other excess hours worked over the employee's 
regularly scheduled working hours or FTE. Actual hours 
worked in excess of the straight time hours specified by 
the 207(k) exception shall be paid at one and one-half 
(l£) times the regular rate to eligible employees. 
Compensatory time off will be preserved, used or 
exchanged for cash payment in accordance with this Policy 
and Procedure and with the FLSA. 
2.3 The Sheriff may elect to make cash payments for overtime 
or grant compensatory time off. Overtime payments shall 
be as follows: 
2.3.1 Cash payment for excess hours is provided at a 
regular rate of pay. 
2.3.2 Cash payment for overtime hours is provided at 
one and one-half (1|) times the regular rate 
for hours worked beyond excess hours. 
2.4 Compensatory Time Off - may be provided in lieu of cash 
payment consistent with 29 C.F.R. 553.23 and if: 
2.4.1 Provided at a regular rate of pay for each 
excess hour worked. 
2.4.2 Provided at the rate of one and one-half (If) 
hours the regular rate each hour of overtime; 
2.4.3 Sworn employees are allowed to accumulate no 
more than 480 hours. 
2.4.4 A FLSA covered terminated employee shall be 
compensated in cash for any compensatory time 
remaining on the books at the rate not less 
than the average rate of pay received by the 
employee during the last three years or the 
final regular rate received by the employee, 
whichever is higher. 
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An employee who requests compensatory time off 
shall be permitted to use such time within a 
reasonable period of time if operations are 
not unduly disrupted. 
Compensatory time shall be utilized within a 
reasonable time not to exceed six (6) months. 
Compensatory time not utilized within six (6) 
months shall be paid in cash. 
The Sheriff, due to unusual seasonal work 
loads, can request an exception to the six (6) 
months compensatory rule (2.4.6) from the 
Merit Commission. This exception, if granted, 
will under no circumstances exceed one year. 
2.5 If County employees work a compensated second job for 
another County agency, then all hours worked for both 
(all) agencies during the standard workweek shall be 
considered jointly for purposes of calculating overtime. 
2.5.1 If County employees work a compensated second 
job for another County agency, then all hours 
worked for both (all) agencies during the 
standard work period shall be considered 
jointly for purposes of calculating overtime. 
2.5.2 The Sheriff may limit employment of 
subordinate employees in other County 
divisions, departments or elected offices if 
such employment adversely impacts his or her 
budget on a long term basis or interferes with 
work performance or the availability of an 
employee to perform regularly assigned duties. 
2.6 Volunteers are exempt from FLSA minimum wage and overtime 
requirements and are not considered employees of the 
County. They may receive a nominal fee, reimbursement 
for expenses, or reasonable benefits. 
2.6.1 County employees may not volunteer to perform 
the same services for the County they provide 
on a regular basis as a paid employee. They 
may however, provide such services for a 
different government employer. 
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3.0 Compensation for FLSA Covered. Called Back Personnel 
3.1 Any eligible employee called back shall be credited a 
minimum of three (3) hours of work time. If three (3) 
hours or more are worked only the actual time worked is 
paid at straight time unless the requirements for 
overtime are met; then all hours shall be paid at one and 
one-half (lj) times the regular rate. 
4.0 FLSA Exempt Overtime Eligibility 
4.1 Cash payment for exempt overtime is not permitted under 
any circumstances during employment or upon termination. 
Compensatory time off shall be provided very sparingly to 
FLSA exempt employees and only for extraordinary 
performance under unusual circumstances. 
4.2 The decision to provide compensatory time off shall be at 
the discretion of the Sheriff. Compensatory time off for 
FLSA exempt employees, if awarded, shall be awarded at 
straight time. 
4.2.1 The Sheriff shall adopt a written internal 
policy regarding compensatory time off for 
those employees exempt from FLSA. In the 
absence of such a policy, the Sheriff will be 
assumed to follow this policy in the 
accumulation of compensatory time for FLSA 
exempt employees. 
4.2.1.1 Such internal written policy must be 
reviewed by the Merit Commission for 
consistency with this policy and be 
approved by the Merit Commission. 
4.2.1.2 A written policy, which authorizes 
compensatory time, shall require 
prior approval of the accumulation 
of compensatory time hours. 
4.2.2 Mo more than sixty (60) hours of compensatory 
time may be accumulated by FLSA exempt 
employees, unless provided for in an internal 
policy approved by the Merit Commission. 
4.3 FLSA exempt employees may be employed in second part-time 
jobs with Salt Lake County. FLSA exempt employees shall 
be paid straight time for hours worked on a second part-
time job with the County, such as seasonal or emergency, 
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if the second job is also exempt. If the second part-
time job is FLSA covered, the employee may be entitled to 
overtime at one and one-half (li) times the regular rate 
and may require approval from the Board of County 
Commissioners. Consult with the Merit Commission in 
these cases. 
5 . 0 Record Keeping 
5.1 The Sheriff's Office Payroll Unit shall ensure that the 
following information is recorded for every employee: 
5.1.1 Full name of employee; 
5.1.2 Time of day the work day begins if different 
than the standard 8-5 work day; 
5.1.3 Daily and total hours of work for each work 
period; 
5.1.4 A document signed by the employee verifying 
hours worked; 
5.1.5 The records must be kept for 3 years. 
5.2 The Payroll Time and Attendance Register shall include 
all overtime for pay calculated on the basis of the 
standard work week and must be reported on the first T & 
A Register possible after completion of the work period. 
5.3 The use of alternative social security numbers for 
payroll purposes shall be prohibited. 
5.4 Hours worked by employees outside of a primary employer's 
regular payroll unit shall be paid for such hours from 
their regular payroll unit. The regular payroll unit 
will make a journal entry for reimbursement from the 
payroll unit for which hours were actually worked. 
APPROVED AND ADOPTED THIS. _DAY OF (AJstJZ/A. «t (9K2 
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ietropolitan Hall of Justice 
37 South Second East 
alt Lake City, Utah 84111 
APTAIN BRUCE THAYNE 
AIL COMMANDER 
N. D. "PETE" HAYWARD 
SHERIFF 
CHARLES J. SHEPHERD 
CHIEF DEPUTY 
I Officer Brock Hudson 
Date Of Issue: 1 / 23 / 90 
have read the 
entire Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office Policies And Procedures Manual. 
I am fully familiar with all of its contents. I realize what my duties 
and responsibilities are to the Sheriffs Office and the Jail Division. 
I will also follow both written and verbal orders given to me by my 
superior officers. 
Date: 6 /20 /90 
Signature 
•*=r 
EXHIBIT 
w b. i\ 
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